Biological Warfare Agreement

Negotiations on the protocol have been slow, in part because of the difficulties inherent in monitoring a biological weapons treaty. Unlike chemical and nuclear weapons, only small quantities of biological weapons are needed initially to produce quantities of major military importance. Even the most dangerous pathogens and toxins cannot be completely banned due to their dual-use nature, including vaccine development and other peaceful applications such as the use of botulinum toxin for cosmetic and medical therapies. Therefore, compliance is measured in terms of intent and not strictly on the basis of possession of prohibited equipment or materials. Finally, biological agents can be quickly produced and disposed of quickly (sometimes within hours), limiting the effectiveness of short-term inspections to determine if facilities are being used for illegal production. Because of these difficulties, the Protocol should build confidence by providing States parties with more information on the facilities of the other that have the potential to be used for the development of biological weapons. It was not designed to detect violations of the convention with the same degree of confidence as the chemical and nuclear weapons treaties. The Seventh Review Conference was held in Geneva from 5 to 22 December 2011. The Final Declaration reaffirmed that „the use of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons is effectively prohibited by the Convention in all circumstances“ and „the determination of States parties to condemn at all times any use of biological agents or toxins, except for peaceful purposes“. [14] According to Arms Control Today, the BTWC`s Eighth Review Conference, held in Geneva in November 2016, had achieved only minimal results and adopted an outcome document reflecting the outcome document of the Seventh Review Conference. As Western countries sought ways to tackle rapid technological change, most participating countries, including Iran and some non-aligned Movement countries, saw the results as a missed opportunity to promote measures to strengthen the legally binding agreement banning the development of biological agents and to ensure that negotiations on resuming efforts to develop the BT Protocol g.

TOILET. [15] The absence of a necessarily intrusive system of inspection and reporting has resulted in States Parties not having strong certainty that they can monitor and verify compliance with the provisions of the BTWC by other members. . . .